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THIS IS THE THIRD AND FINAL EDITED DOCUMENT in a series relating to the develop-
ment of the Churchill Park “Garden Suburb” in St. John’s, Newfoundland in the
1940s. The first (Sharpe, 2000) discussed the 1939 proposal by a city councillor for
a municipal housing scheme that, had it been approved, would have constituted a
direct attempt to improve the living conditions of some of the households in the in-
ner city. The second (Sharpe, 2006) outlines the detailed proposals for the Chur-
chill Park development. The Government at the time consisted of an English
Governor and six commissioners, three English and three Newfoundlanders,
all appointed by the British government. It accepted these proposals as a politically
acceptable means of increasing residential mobility in the city, thereby indirectly
reducing downtown densities and, perhaps, allowing the city to demolish some of
the most dilapidated downtown houses. It was also seen as a way of providing both
employment and housing for returning service personnel. The two documents pre-
sented below pick up the story in 1944 when the Chairman of the St. John’s Hous-
ing Corporation (SJHC) was forced by political and public pressure to defend the
decision of the Corporation not to build houses for the poor.
A month prior to the outbreak of World War II, the Newfoundland Commis-
sioner for Finance
1
wrote to one of his colleagues about the slum problem of St.
John’s, describing it as “one of the most pressing which we have to meet” but not-
ing that, unfortunately, “the re-housing of the lowest grade of the slum areas ap-
pears to be out of the question except on a purely eleemosynary basis.”
2
St. John’s, like most other North American cities, faced two intractable hous-
ing-related problems in the 1940s: an overall shortage of accommodation leading
to overcrowding, and a large area of “slum” housing in the downtown. The slum
was probably no worse than that found elsewhere in Canada, but it had been a
source of municipal concern and embarrassment since before the turn of the cen-
tury (Evening Telegram, 1925) and its continued presence in a city now overrun
with service personnel from Canada and the United States was a source of embar-
rassment and concern.
Several reports had been written about the situation, two by leading Canadian
town planners Arthur Dalzell (1926) and Frederick J. Todd (1930). After a 1929 in-
vestigation of land values and building costs, the housing subcommittee of the
city’s Town Planning Commission reported its conclusion that rehousing the popu-
lation in new dwellings built in situ would be impossible. However, the report pro-
posed a solution that became the basis of housing policy in many North American
jurisdictions after World War II, despite the fact that it has never been shown to
work effectively.
3
As explicated by the American housing economist Richard
Ratcliff (1945), it became known as the “filtering” or “trickle-down” theory. It
worked on the assumption that when new, good-quality dwellings are added to a
city’s housing stock, the people who move into them will thereby free up their for-
mer dwellings, which are presumably older and less expensive, for occupancy by
another household that is also interested in improving their housing situation. Thus
households filter up and vacancies filter, or trickle, down. A critical assumption
was that eventually the downward-moving vacancy would end up in a dwelling so
dilapidated that nobody wanted it and it would be demolished. The attraction of this
theory was that it obviated the necessity of undertaking slum clearance and/or the
construction of new dwellings for the poor. As long as the supply of houses contin-
ued to exceed the immediate demand, the market would ensure that everyone was
decently housed, and the poorest-quality dwellings would be removed from the in-
ventory. This option was attractive for governments that recognized the impossibil-
ity of investing municipal, provincial, or national resources in a program of direct
housing provision for the poor. Such a policy would inevitably involve the politi-
cally explosive notion of subsidies on behalf of those whom many voters would
consider undeserving. All the government had to do was ensure an adequate supply
of new housing, which it could do by supporting the house-building industry by fis-
cal and other policies.
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The Planning Commission report concluded that by providing regularly em-
ployed men — an important caveat — with “new and better houses we should not
only be benefitting them and their families, but also indirectly the other occupants
of the congested areas. The tendency would be in the course of time that the worst
houses would be abandoned. Indeed, if a few hundred houses were erected for
those able ... to pay for them, it should render possible putting into operation a pol-
icy of condemning the worst dwellings on health grounds and thereby gradually
improving the general state of housing from the bottom.”
Unfortunately, the city was never able to find the money required to implement
the recommendations of any of the reports. So, on the eve of World War II, the cen-
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tral core of St. John’s was still in such a bad way that a visiting British journalist
wrote that a visit to Newfoundland was “like stepping back into the Middle Ages”
(quoted in Neary, 1995: 5).
JOHN MEANEY’S PROPOSED HOUSING SCHEME
St. John’s was never lacking in eloquent and well-informed citizens. One of them
was City Councillor John T. Meaney who, on 4 May 1939, proposed that the Mu-
nicipal Council ask the Commission of Government to provide funds sufficient to
build 500 new homes within the means of “wage-earning, industrious citizens”
(Daily News, 1939; Sharpe, 2000). This would not directly improve housing condi-
tions in the inner city. But it would be a necessary first step because the inability to
demolish the worst houses in the city, many of which had already been condemned
as unfit for human habitation, prevented the building of new, better-quality dwell-
ings.
When the proposal arrived on his desk, the Commissioner for Finance dis-
missed it in scathing terms as unworkable, noting that nothing had changed in terms
of the basic conditions of the city or its economy in the previous decade. On the ba-
sis of what he referred to as the “prevailing English rule” that rent should not ex-
ceed one-sixth of the income of a person of “small or moderate means,” he
estimated that a “relatively well off” mechanic or general labourer could not hope
to carry a rent in excess of $10. The cheapest grade of house proposed by Meaney
would have required a monthly rental of $16. Therefore the proposals “do not carry
us very far from a practical standpoint [because] they would not provide houses
even of the cheapest kind at rentals which would suit even the better class of family
at present occupying the slum areas.”
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It was easy for the Commission to dismiss the city’s proposal because of the
prevalent attitude among the affluent intelligentsia that there really was no effec-
tive or politically acceptable way of improving the housing situation of the poor.
Showing the arrogance and paternalism that many Newfoundlanders properly re-
sented, the Commissioner for Natural Resources (J.H. Gorvin
6
) warned that if new
municipal housing was built for the unemployed and the casual labouring class “the
danger is that new slums will be created in addition to the slums that have been va-
cated. The people must be taught new ways of living before they can take responsi-
bility for the upkeep of a new neighbourhood.”
7
Gorvin’s opinion that direct, in situ
rehousing of the inner-city poor was not a feasible policy was shared by his col-
leagues. To be fair, it should be remembered that their attitude was not very differ-
ent from that held by many Canadian politicians and senior officials within the
Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) towards subsidized housing in
the 1950s and 1960s (Dennis and Fish, 1972: ch. 5; Bacher, 1993: ch. 5).
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In March 1941, City Council, having now waited almost two years for a re-
sponse to its housing proposal, wrote again to the Government, asking for a deci-
sion. This time the Government responded quickly and rejected the proposal,
arguing that it could not support any plan that did not directly provide better accom-
modation for the ill-housed. The Government certainly did not imply that new
houses had to be built for them. Having obviously accepted the feasibility of relying
on the filtering process, its reply to the city noted that “it might be possible to build
new houses for existing households who are above the line of extreme poverty, the
houses vacated by them being used to replace the houses unfit for further use.”
However, since the Government believed that the city suffered from what it re-
ferred to as “a distressingly large number of families living in permanent poverty,”
and not a lack of housing, therefore:
a scheme to provide them with better housing conditions independently of any in-
crease in their earning power would be a scheme to superimpose upon the present
scheme of public relief a further measure of relief in the form of housing at much less
than cost.... Until the number of such impoverished families in St. John’s undergoes a
substantial reduction as a result of either improved general conditions, or transfer of
population, the financial problem involved in relieving the housing conditions of this
class is of such magnitude that, in our view, it is quite out of the question to attempt to
tackle it in a period of uncertainty created by war conditions.... Much as we regret
having been forced to this conclusion, we apprehend that schemes for the re-housing
of the people are only practicable at the present time in so far as they can be linked in
some way with the existence of fairly steady employment for those who are to be
re-housed. We consider that it is not unreasonable that the larger employers of labour
in the City should be expected to recognize an obligation in this respect.... [and they]
should make some contribution to the solution of the housing problem.
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The Government suggested that large employers be asked to gather data on the
housing conditions of their employees so that a plan might be developed under
which employees, employers, the city and the Government could co-operate in a
“series of small but useful housing schemes for the lowest paid wage earners.”
THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO HOUSING AND TOWN
PLANNING IN ST. JOHN’S
A year later, in April 1942, the city called the Commission’s bluff by writing to ask
that it appoint a Commission of Enquiry “to enquire into the housing situation in St.
John’s.” The city offered to pay all the Commission’s expenses. All they wanted the
Government to do was to appoint the members and provide moral support. The
mandate of the Commission would be to “make enquiry into and a survey of the
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question of housing in the City ... with reference to some plan ... whereby houses
may be erected for those who are unable ... to do so themselves, and for this purpose
to enquire into the cost of houses, location of same, transportation, methods of fi-
nancing ... and to consider, in relation to the foregoing the re-planning of the City.”9
The Government did as requested, and appointed the Commission of Enquiry
into Housing and Town Planning (CEHTP) on 12 May 1942 under the chairmanship
of Mr. Justice Brian Dunfield of the Newfoundland Supreme Court.
10
The CEHTP
issued five so-called Interim Reports, all written by Dunfield, whose views on the
situation facing the city were characteristically blunt. He wrote that the role of the
CEHTP was “to get at the fundamentals which have made our city the dirty, con-
gested, ill-built, planless and expensive thing which in great part it is, and was be-
fore the war influx took place” (CEHTP, 1943: 9). Enjoying the freedom of
expression that came with his status in the community, he told the Rotary Club “we
have ... probably the most backward town on the east coast of North America ...
(which) we are still running ... like a fishing village” (Daily News, 1943b).
The Third Interim Report summarized the results of the Commission’s survey
of housing and proposed a surprising remedy — the building of a “garden suburb”
in the Northern Valley (Sharpe, 2006). The development, which came to be known
later as Churchill Park, would serve multiple objectives: promote the clearing of the
downtown slum; increase the housing supply in the city and thereby indirectly pro-
vide an opportunity for the rehousing of some of the ill-housed; introduce moder-
nity in house design and town planning to the city; provide housing for returning
veterans; facilitate the orderly future expansion of the city; and help restore the bat-
tered self-confidence of the people of the city. Most of these objectives were met.
The eradication of the slum and the rehousing of some of its residents were not.
The Report recommended that the new development be built by a newly cre-
ated, independent body. Blithely unaware of the consequences, the Government
accepted this recommendation and established the St. John’s Housing Corporation
(SJHC) on 19 July 1944 with Brian Dunfield as its first Chairman. Dunfield, who
once had complained to a colleague that his judicial duties were rarely onerous
enough to occupy him in the afternoon (Bartlett, 1999), threw himself into the pro-
ject. He was suffused with a Victorian zeal to “do good works” and let nothing
stand in his way. He incessantly badgered and cajoled the Government to get the re-
sources he believed were necessary, and during the five years that he chaired the
Corporation he was largely successful. Working with a speed unheard of in today’s
world, the Corporation began work on the first major project, the laying out of Eliz-
abeth Avenue, on 25 October 1944; laid the foundation of the first house on 6 July
1945; and offered the first 30 houses for sale on 5 June 1946.
Did the members of the CEHTP really believe that a suburban housing develop-
ment would solve, or at least ameliorate, the downtown slum problem? Gordon
Winter,
11
an original member of the Corporation who succeeded Dunfield as Chair-
man of the SJHC in 1949, didn’t think that anybody other than Dunfield believed it
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(Winter, 1999). Dr. Leonard Miller, another member of the first Board, recalled
that “the part about slums was put in for political reasons, although Brian Dunfield
believed he could do it, in part” (Miller, 1981). A cynic might suggest that the refer-
ence to slum clearance was no more than a selling point in the Commission’s effort
to get the Government to agree to establish and fund the SJHC so that a desire on the
part of the well-meaning members of the CEHTP to do something to help the poor
and downtrodden might be fulfilled.
Relations between the SJHC and the City Council were always poor and the
growing realization that the new suburban development would have no short-term
effect on housing conditions in the city made them worse (Collier, 2011: 45).
Mayor Andrew Carnell bitterly resented the fact that the Corporation had been
given significant financial support from the Government in order to build a suburb,
which at that time lay outside the municipal boundary. That the city had also pro-
vided grants and loans to the Corporation exacerbated the situation, and although
Carnell had originally agreed to participate in the sod-turning ceremony marking
the beginning of work on Elizabeth Avenue, the Corporation’s first major under-
taking, he pulled out at the last moment. He subsequently began to refer to the Chur-
chill Park project as “The New Jerusalem.”
12
Context is all-important in the explanation of townscape, and the absence of
responsible government in Newfoundland between 1934 and 1949 is a critical part
of this story. Had Newfoundland not been governed by a “benign oligarchy” in the
form of the Commission of Government (Rowe, 1980: 417) it is unlikely that Chur-
chill Park would have been built (Winter, 1999). Another important contextual ele-
ment was the changing world view of Newfoundlanders during the 1940s. The
traditional loyalty to Britain was replaced by an attachment to a more prosperous
North America (Jackson, 1986). The presence in the small and impoverished coun-
try of large numbers of relatively affluent Canadian and American servicemen and
the temporary prosperity brought to the country by the war meant that “a rising tide
of expectation, of demands for a better life, swept across the country ... and a people
who had known nothing but adversity and who had forfeited their self-government
as the penalty for bankruptcy, regained their pride and determination” (Roberts,
1967: 102). They could never go back to what they had been (Neary and
O’Flaherty, 1983: 147).
In considering the alacrity with which the Commission of Government and the
St. John’s Municipal Council
13
accepted the recommendations of the CEHTP, cre-
ated the SJHC, and poured money into it with a minimumof restrictions, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind the newly acquired Newfoundland reverence for the lifestyle,
the physical manifestations, and the “modernity” of life on the mainland.
14
The de-
sire was widespread to replace the architectural motifs of the past with symbols of
the new-found prosperity and self-confidence, to assuage a feeling of inferiority,
and to prove that Newfoundlanders were just as capable, just as urbane, as anybody
else in North America. The cultural landscape of Churchill Park cannot be read, nor
104 Sharpe
its significance assessed, if one does not understand this. If it was true that
Newfoundlanders were resigned to the view that “they were an inept, helpless race,
fated for nothing better than a life of bare survival and even capable of that only under
the benevolent auspices of governors and entrepreneurs of other breeds more compe-
tent than they” (Jackson, 1986: 68), then Cook, Dunfield, and others wanted to show
that this was no longer the case. As Dunfield reminded the Rotary Club (Daily News,
1943c):
remember we have had a disgrace to wipe off. We are the North American community
which collapsed and threw its hand in, and that is a disgrace to us all.... Just think how
nice it would be if it could go forth to the world in a year or two that down in New-
foundland they were reconstructing their capital city in a more thorough and whole-
sale way than had ever been done anywhere else. Why should we not be leaders? Let
us get together and try.
THE IMPACT OF MILITARY BASE CONSTRUCTION IN ST. JOHN’S
Another significant contextual element was the debate over whether the acute
wartime shortage of accommodation in the city was caused by the influx of military
personnel and their families or the migration of “baymen” to St. John’s in the hope
of finding employment on one of the Canadian or American bases. It was com-
monly believed at the time that it was the former (Evening Telegram, 1943a, 1943b,
1943c, 1943d; Daily News, 1943a).15 The city had suffered from a shortage of rea-
sonable-quality housing for some time and the virtual cessation of house-building
during the Depression had made an already bad situation much worse. The imposi-
tion of rent control on 30 December 1941 may have stabilized the expenditures of
families already in possession of rented accommodation, but this did nothing to in-
crease the supply. The 1942 CEHTP housing survey found that nearly 40 per cent of
the houses from which responses were received could be classified as anywhere
from tolerably bad (22 per cent) to bad (11 per cent) to very bad and in need of im-
mediate demolition (5 per cent). And the situation may well have been worse than
suggested by these incomplete results, since one might reasonably assume that the
households living in the very worst houses might have made up the majority of
those who did not return the survey questionnaire. The war brought prosperity to
the country because of the millions of dollars spent by the Canadian and American
governments on the building and maintenance of the bases. It brought employment
opportunities to thousands of Newfoundland women and men. But it did not con-
tribute directly to the city, as neither of the foreign governments was subject to mu-
nicipal taxation. The war did, however, exacerbate the already serious housing
shortage (Sharpe and Shawyer, 2010). The CEHTP was not convinced that the pros-
perity would outlast the war. In the words of the Third Report, “we have not thought
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it our duty to attempt to deal with the temporary conditions in St. John’s caused by
the influx of war workers. These, bad as they are, are a passing phase, indeed a
phase beginning perhaps to pass already” (CEHTP, 1943: 9). Dunfield took up this
question again in the first document reprinted below.
It is impossible to determine exactly how many workers moved into St. John’s
to take advantage of base-related employment. The building “boom” occurred in
1942, and by 1943, when about 9,250 were employed on bases in Newfoundland
and Labrador with an unknown number in St. John’s and vicinity, the workforce
was already in decline. One source puts the number working at the American Fort
Pepperrell at 5,000 in November 1941 (High, 2003: 87). An analysis of the data
from the 1942 CEHTP survey shows that 472 (8 per cent) of the 5,803 gainfully em-
ployed people living in the houses that responded had base-related employment
and of those only 67 (14 per cent of the 472 and just over 1 per cent of the 5,803) had
moved into St. John’s since the beginning of the base construction period.
16
There-
fore, Dunfield concluded, there was no incontrovertible evidence that base workers
contributed to the overcrowding problem in the city.
By the end of 1943 the main phase of the Battle of the Atlantic was effectively
over and the threat of a successful invasion of North America had disappeared. One
would think that this would have meant a major reduction in the size of the Canadian
and American garrisons in Newfoundland. Certainly, the size of the Royal Canadian
Navy establishment was reduced in early 1944 and many of the vessels redeployed to
European ports in anticipation of the D-Day invasion. But the soldiers and airmen re-
mained. The diplomatic pas de deux between the two nations for post-war supremacy
in Newfoundland, and the inertia embodied in military logistical planning, ensured
that large numbers of military personnel remained in the city for another year.
It is likely that at the peak of the military occupation there were as many as
13,500 foreign military personnel in the city: 8,500 Canadians (1,600 Army, 3,300
Royal Canadian Air Force [RCAF], and 3,600 Royal Canadian Navy [RCN]) and be-
tween 3,500 and 5,000 Americans. This would have amounted to about a third of
the pre-war population of St. John’s. The number of ship-borne RCN personnel
would have ranged anywhere between 1,500 and 4,000 depending on how many
ships, and of what type, were in port. Counting them would raise the total number of
foreigners to as high as 40 per cent of the city’s population. Most of the military per-
sonnel were housed inside the boundaries of the bases, but not all. Just over 2,000
RCN personnel had ration books at the end of 1943, indicating that they were living
off-base. Some also had wives and other dependants vying for the scarce supply of
food and accommodation. The Americans sent home all of their dependants within
days of the Pearl Harbor attack, but the Canadians did not. The Air Officer Com-
manding No. 1 Group RCAF argued that since St. John’s was a war zone, no depend-
ants should be permitted to stay. However, the Flag Officer Newfoundland Force
argued that the presence of wives in port was essential to the maintenance of morale
among his crews. The Commission of Government unsuccessfully pressured the
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service chiefs to send all dependants home. A compromise was agreed to in March
1944 whereby the number of dependants permitted in the city was limited to 740:
60 for the RCAF, 280 for the Canadian Army, and 400 for the RCN. So it does not
seem likely that Canadian military dependants contributed in any significant or
long-term way to overcrowding in the city’s housing stock, although the number of
off-base RCN officers and ratings was clearly an issue.
AN ENDURING MYSTERY
Why the Commission of Government agreed to support the costly and risky enter-
prise of expropriating 800 acres of farmland and building a huge new suburb re-
mains a mystery. The decision was presumably rooted in several factors, one of
which was noblesse oblige. Three of the commissioners had backgrounds in colo-
nial or British administration, and the Governor was a retired Royal Naval Admiral.
It is easy to understand how the application of rigorous town planning principles,
based on by now well-established British practice, would have appealed to them.
The prospect of a “colonial” people being provided with a new suburban develop-
ment founded on modern principles of hygiene and public health would have been
irresistible. The collective administrative experience of the commissioners makes
it likely they would have appreciated that the orderly and efficient accommodation
of the post-war growth of St. John’s was a high priority, and that this project would
help ensure it (Lewis and Shrimpton, 1984). They also could not have been igno-
rant of the fact that by the 1940s the Commission was subject to severe and not-un-
deserved criticism for its failure to communicate honestly with and effectively
engage the people, and for its ineffectiveness in solving the economic woes of the
country (Rowe 1980: 417). Critics of the Commission, especially its English members,
have always described themas little more than uninspired, time-serving administrators,
unconcerned with the future of a country in which they had no intention of staying be-
yond the end of their appointment. There is undoubtedly some truth in this criticism.
But they were not stupid men, and by 1944 they were no longer looking for ku-
dos or praise. They knew that no matter what they did they would not hope to get
much in the way of credit, and they would never be popular. But they could, and
did, evaluate the recommendations of the CEHTP on the basis of cold-blooded com-
mon sense. They were as concerned as others were by the fact that the capital city’s
housing shortage was about to be exacerbated by the return of Newfoundland vet-
erans and that the glorious days of virtually full employment were about to end.
They would have appreciated that the proposed new suburban development prom-
ised concrete results that would have perceptible benefits in the relatively short
term, including many construction jobs and a substantial number of modern houses
in a well-planned environment, which would help alleviate the anticipated
post-war housing shortage. Perhaps it was this reasoning that led to the Govern-
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ment’s decision to proceed with the project, which represented a great leap into the
unknown and placed a huge responsibility on Brian Dunfield.
THE “SLUM CLEARANCE” PROBLEM
There were only two obvious solutions to the intractable problem of eliminat-
ing the slums in the inner core of St. John’s: build new housing for the poor; or rely
on the filtering up of households and the filtering down of housing. It was assumed
that these countervailing movements would occur after an injection of new houses
into the market. One thing was clear. As Thomas Adams, the Chairman of the Town
Planning Branch of the federal government’s Commission of Conservation told the
Canadian Club of Montreal in 1914, it was an unwise practice to pull down dilapi-
dated houses unless the facilities existed to erect new houses to replace them
(Simpson, 1982). The City Council of St. John’s, the Commission of Government,
and Brian Dunfield all understood this basic reality. But they faced three funda-
mental questions: who was to be responsible for building the new houses, where
could they be located, and how might they be paid for? Furthermore, the SJHC was
not empowered to build units within the city boundary, and neither Dunfield nor the
Government were in the least inclined to court public derision by suggesting that
subsidized housing of any kind should be provided in the new suburb.
17
They were
men of their time, and although Dunfield in particular seems to have been inspired
by a genuine desire to “do good,” he was not a revolutionary. As a Justice of the Su-
preme Court of Newfoundland it would have been ill-advised for him to appear as
one. But he had obviously read and accepted the recommendations of the best
minds of the day on how best to tackle the problems of slum housing.
Dunfield may truly have believed that the building of a garden suburb north of
the city would lead to an improvement in slum conditions in the inner city. But he
knew it would be a slow process, dependent on what he called the “general
move-up process,” which we would now call “filtering.” In his own words (Eve-
ning Telegram, 1942):
The first step would be to build as many small houses as we could find purchasers for.
When enough of these had been built to relieve the present terrific pressure on the
city, the worst of the slum houses would begin to fall vacant, and the city could start
condemning them and pulling them down.... How many houses will have to be pro-
vided before the pressure is eased, it is impossible to say. A thousand is the minimum,
in order to free the thousand houses which ought to be condemned. It might need a
good many more, because of the present overcrowding.
The detailed proposals and provisional cost estimates for Churchill Park were con-
tained in the Fifth Interim Report of the CEHTP, published in January 1944. Nestled in its
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30 pages was a critically important, four-page section that had been circulating within the
Commission of Government a month prior to the publication of the complete report
(Dunfield, 1943).
18
This brief section was a justification for the fact that the house-build-
ing activity of the SJHC was not going to have any direct, or even immediate, effect on the
downtown slum. This is the first of the documents reproduced below.
However, by May of 1944, Dunfield was forced to go on the defensive as he
prepared the ground he would soon be walking as Chairman of the new SJHC. Dis-
may grew as the limitations of the mandate given to the SJHC came to be widely ap-
preciated. So, using one of the most effective ways of spreading a message
throughout St. John’s (and indeed the country, as the proceedings were broadcast
on the radio and published verbatim in the local press), he explained to a meeting of
the Rotary Club (Daily News, 1945a) that:
... we hear at time a lot of loose talk about slum clearance. That is the ultimate object,
but it cannot be the immediate object.... The money is public, it is limited; and we in-
tend to get the utmost value for it. We shall not be a hand-out corporation, but as
strictly business-like and hard-boiled as anyone on Water Street.... We have to do
some slum clearance if and when we can, but in the meantime we first have to provide
for those who can pay their way.
The following month the citizens of St. John’s were riveted by accounts of the
death of Mary Ellen Hutchings, a 10-year-old girl who had recently died in a squalid
shack on Blackhead Road from a combination of starvation, exposure, and gangrene
resulting from frostbite. The house in which Mary Ellen died lay outside the city
boundary, but within the one-mile-wide zone over which it had jurisdiction. It was
less than a mile from the offices of the newly instituted Child Welfare Division of the
Department of Public Health and Welfare and the city’s hospitals. Several letters to
the editors of both St. John’s daily newspapers argued that this incident was yet an-
other indication of how civic authorities were neglecting their basic duty to provide
care (Evening Telegram 1944a, 1944b, 1944c; Daily News, 1944).
The SJHC was drawn into the discussion of the tragedy, perhaps inadvertently,
by City Councillor James Spratt. The Corporation had not yet held its first meeting
— that didn’t occur until 24 July, but by now both the city and the Government had
approved the reports of the CEHTP, which called for the creation of the Corporation
and the building of a new suburb. In a letter to the editor (Evening Telegram,
1944d) Spratt wrote:
Many proposals have been made to improve housing conditions in this community by
the building of new homes for the poor, and the clearing out of slum areas now exist-
ing. Much time has been spent (perhaps I should say “lost”) by public bodies in dis-
cussion, without bringing about the results so necessary and so much to be desired.
However, Utopian ideas have been accepted, and it has been decided to create Vil-
lages “A,” “B” and “C” in our nearby suburbs, to accommodate those who can afford
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to pay for modern, well-equipped and expensive homes. When is something to be
done — even by this Council, of which I am a member — which will directly benefit
the poor of our city, and remove forever from our midst conditions which may bring
about a repetition of the terrible suffering of little Mary Ellen Hutchings?
Spratt’s letter is easily interpreted as a criticism of the mandate of the SJHC, and of
the two governments that had approved of its establishment. The impact of this crit-
icism was heightened by a renewal of public concern about the proliferation of
“shack towns” on the unregulated periphery of the city. Dunfield may well have
been caught by surprise at the ferocity of the public response to the death of the
Hutchings girl, and would probably have taken much of the criticism personally.
By November he was concerned that he might be losing the battle for public opin-
ion at a very inopportune time, just as he was about to breathe life into the SJHC and
commence what he must have thought would be his major contribution to the future
well-being of his native city. In an effort to justify and defend the mandate he and
the SJHC had been given, he crafted a carefully-argued memorandum “suggesting
effort to improve the condition of ‘shack’ dwelling houses before the coming win-
ter” (Dunfield, 1944). This document is the second one reproduced below.
THE “WIDOWS’ MANSIONS”
Despite the widespread aversion to the idea of subsidized housing for the poor,
it was generally accepted that there would always be some households in need of
housing assistance from the government and that it was appropriate to provide it.
As Dunfield noted during the first meeting of the CEHTP, “a housing programme in-
evitably implies some degree of public aid towards the housing of the low-
est-income-quarter of the population” (Evening Telegram, 1942). The abiding
concern of some members of the City Council for the most disadvantaged residents
led to a meeting with the Government in December 1944 at which the possibility of
a joint city-Government housing project for indigent widows and their children
was discussed. The Government had, for some months, been holding firm to its po-
sition that the responsibility for rehousing the inhabitants of dwellings condemned
by the city and demolished lay with the municipality. But perhaps there was a
thought that involvement in a project designed to assist a few of the city’s most se-
verely disadvantaged women would redound its credit.
It is interesting to note how completely some of the commissioners had ac-
cepted the arguments that Dunfield had incorporated into the reports of the CEHTP,
and which drove the policy of the SJHC.
19
The Commissioner for Public Utilities
and Supply noted that “it was not within the realm of practical politics to build
houses for everybody, but the problem of finding accommodation for the poorest
classes was usually solved by the wealthy and middle-class people acquiring new
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and better homes, which resulted in a general move-up on the part of the lower
classes.” The Commissioner for Finance disagreed, saying that he didn’t see why
the 100 houses that were under discussion couldn’t be made part of the scheme for
the Corporation. Councillor Oliver Vardy, who would later serve for 20 years
(1951-71) as the third chairman of the SJHC, took the opportunity of expressing dis-
appointment at the failure of the Housing Corporation to solve the slum housing
problem. While this might now be considered an unfair criticism, given that the
Corporation had only been in existence for five months, Vardy’s understanding of
its limited mandate was correct.
20
The necessity for direct action was discussed at a subsequent meeting a week
later. J.C. Puddester, Commission for Public Health and Welfare, noted that he
was:
aware that the St. John’s Housing Corporation had not provided in their programme
for the building of houses for the classes of people now under consideration, i.e. wid-
ows and orphans, the destitute, the sick, etc. ... and he thought that very few of the des-
titute widows and those in similar circumstances, for whom the Government is now
paying rent, would move into houses vacated by citizens who would occupy the new
dwellings erected in the Housing Area.
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At this meeting Dunfield offered to have the Corporation build the 100 houses if the
city were to provide a suitable site, and if the Government were to give him the
power to operate within the present city limits. In the end, the Corporation had
nothing to do with the project — Dunfield wrote to the Government in January
1945 asking to be “released from the building of these structures if the Government
can see its way to it.” He said that the Corporation was already having trouble with
local contractors who objected to the fact that it was insisting on building its houses
using its own workforce, and that in any case he was afraid of “biting off more than
we can chew.”22 However, the city and the Government proceeded with the
“Widows’ Mansions” project, which saw 17 concrete block buildings, each con-
taining four, five-room apartments, built on Cashin Avenue in 1947 — the first
public housing in the city.23
FIGHTING A REARGUARD ACTION
Dunfield’s brief flirtation with the idea of making this small, direct contribu-
tion to the problem of slum clearance, and the enduring power of the rhetoric that
had served him so well for so long, wasn’t enough to convince the doubters that the
Corporation was doing all it could, or should. Two years later he was still trying to
convince the Government and the people of the city that, in time, the work of his
Corporation would have an impact on the city’s housing problems, but that time
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was not yet. In his year-end report for 1946 (Daily News, 1946) he continued to de-
fend his reliance on the filtering process, repeating arguments he had made previ-
ously to both the Government and the public. He wrote:
The Corporation is sometimes asked why it does not build houses for the labouring
classes or the “slum dwellers”. The answer is that it is not possible to do so within their
means at present prices or material and labour.... the Corporation considers that at
present it can only seek to increase the supply of houses by building for buyers of as
modest an income as possible; this in itself eases matters for the poorer classes by tak-
ing away some of the competition for the houses already in town, and reducing the
scarcity which leads to high rents.
Unfortunately, some of the extravagant predictions Dunfield made during the
campaign to get the SJHC created came back to haunt him. At the end of 1945 the ed-
itor of the Daily News reminded his readers of the claim that the building of the new
houses up in the northern valley would have a positive impact on the housing condi-
tions in the core of the slum. His year-end review illustrates how the cautions that
Dunfield usually attached to this bold prediction got lost in the retelling of the story.
He wrote (Daily News, 1945b) that:
... the idea behind the (housing) scheme was that many persons would move out of
second and third grade housing to the new area, leaving their vacated homes for the
use of persons even more inadequately housed, who would move up a grade or two.
The objective was ultimately to get the people in the worst slum areas into better
homes vacated by migrants to the suburbs, leaving their own areas to be cleared in a
general municipal housing scheme.
Dunfield had never guaranteed that this would happen. He had merely suggested
that this is what might be expected. The fact that “filtering” was not an effective
mechanism to effect slum clearance would not be known for at least two decades —
too late to influence the debate in St. John’s.
In October 1946 Dunfield had one last public opportunity to defend the record
of the SJHC when he was called before the Finance Committee of Newfoundland’s
newly elected National Convention (Hiller and Harrington, 1995). Knowing that
he was in a hostile environment, facing implacable opposition from several of the
members, he gave a bravura performance that cannot be faulted in terms of the logic
of the argument. He said:
unless the Government, or somebody is able to find, say, 15 million dollars or so ...
which is out of reach (and they would have to kiss most of that money goodbye) we
cannot clear the slums directly; therefore we say let us apply the Canadian or Ameri-
can system, seek out the man, going as low down the scale as we can, who, if he gets a
long term mortgage at low interest rates, can at last afford the house he wants and he
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will move out and everybody else will move one place up. That seems the method best
suited to our conditions, and the only method the financial situation will enable us to
apply.
Having outlined some of Dunfield’s thinking about slum clearance and the dynam-
ics of the housing market in 1940s Newfoundland, we can now turn our attention to
two documents he wrote when trying to explain his stance to those who were going
to pay the bills.
* * *
DOCUMENT ONE
DISCUSSION REGARDING SLUM CLEARANCE
1. The “Slum Clearance” Problem
Members of the Commission of Government have asked us what we can pro-
pose about “slum clearance.” By this they mean, as we understand it, what can we
do about the immediate pulling down of the worst slum houses and the rehousing of
the people now living therein. Our scheme, as they see it, involves the building of
many houses, but to a large extent for those who can afford to pay for them, at once
or by instalments, and a great deal of this may have to be done before the people in
the worst slums, many or most of whom cannot afford to pay much, get relief. Le us
discuss the pros and cons of this question.
2. The Ideal Position as to House Occupation
We are told in British and American books by housing experts that a town is in
the ideal position as regards housing when about five per cent of houses are vacant.
This keeps rents and land prices at a reasonable level, and gives the population a
chance to shift about. The tenant will then pay and the house owner will get the fair
value of accommodation; but the house owner will not get a scarcity value for his
house, which he ought not to get, and the tenant will not be in the position that he is
desperate and can be “held up” for an unreasonable price or rent.
3.Our Actual Position
There are, at a guess, about 8,000 houses in the community, including the
close-in suburbs. We have no exact count on the suburbs, except in the “Housing
Area” (275 dwellings), but we guess that there are about 1,000 in all in the close-in
suburbs. There are exactly 7,005 dwellings in the City Limits (City Assessor’s fig-
ures). Of these we examined 4,613 in our survey. But, so far are we from having 5
percent of houses vacant that we have apparently not less than 1,500 families in ex-
cess of the houses in the community. It is no wonder that houses have a scarcity
value.
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4. How Far Have We to Go?
That seems to mean that we must put up at least 1,500 houses in order to get to
the position of one family per house. But if we have also to pull down about 1,000
houses unfit for habitation, we must put up at least 2,500 houses to get one family
per house. The worst slums, then, cannot all be pulled down until at least 2,500
houses have been built.
5.Outsiders Now in the Town
We cannot get accurate figures on this without a census. But it looks as if the
effect of the influx of outsiders is not as great as is often supposed. For example,
families of naval ratings stationed here are 242; not a great proportion. Naval rat-
ings living out of barracks are under 2,000 (out of a total population of 65,000) and
these are lodgers, not family men, so far as this City is concerned. The St. John’s
Carpenters’ Union is stated to have about 900 members at present, of whom 300 to
400 are the old-standing carpenters of St. John’s. Of the 500 to 600 others, presum-
ably outport men in the main, most would be lodgers only, and probably most out-
port men now in town are in as carpenters. Again, construction in town for foreign
armed forces is long past its peak. These indications, the only ones we have avail-
able, go to confirm our view that our overcrowding problem is largely a permanent
local one.
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6. Problem of Temporary Accommodation
If then we are asked today to pull down slum houses and rebuild for their occu-
pants, supposing that could be done, we should have to find temporary accommo-
dation for the occupants. But that cannot be found except by building, and any
decent temporary accommodation would cost to build nearly, if not quite, as much
as the new houses themselves. And on what land is it to be put? And what price
would today be asked for that land? Where is there any sewered land that could be
got for the purpose in the City Limits? (After the war we might get some disused
military barracks cheaply for this purpose. But there would still be some expense in
adapting them for even temporary family use. They are not designed for that.) The
real problem is shortage of sewered land. That is why we are proposing an exten-
sive new sewerage system in the Northern Suburb.
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7. Problem of the Classes of Accommodation
But there is still this further problem. The 4,613 houses which we roughly
graded come out as follows:
Class A. Excellent 260
Class B. Poor 736
Class C. Fair 1,867
Class D. Tolerable 1,000 (but poor, and better replaced)
114 Sharpe
Class E. Bad 525 (ought to be condemned at an
early date)
Class F. Very bad 225 (ought to be condemned at once)
But consider the position here shown as regards bathroom and sanitary accommo-
dation. If we describe these classes in plainer terms they would be as follows:
A. Luxury 5.6% (100% bath and sewerage)
B. Good 15.9% (100% bath and sewerage)
C. Fair to Poor 40.5% (99.9% water and sewerage, 38.5% bath)
D. Semi-slum 21.7% (92.8% water and sewerage, 10% bath)
E. Bad slum 11.4% (44% water and sewerage, 0.8% bath)
F. Wrecks of houses 4.9% (21% water and sewerage, 0.4% bath)
In other words, 38% of our housing is in the semi-slum or slum class.
Now, the poorest house a modern housing authority could build would have
good design, good layout, good light and air, sound foundations and walls, some
sort of heating, some insulation for heat economy and comfort, plastered or insulat-
ing-board inside walls, a complete bathroom with hot and cold water, clean, decent
and attractive surroundings, with some grass and trees. No authority could build
otherwise. To build cheap, crowded shacks is merely to make a new slum in a few
years.
But the trouble is that, on account of our very low all-over standard of housing,
this house, though small, would be practically equal to Class B, better than Class C,
and better than 75 percent of the population have today. Could a housing authority,
therefore, set about a wholesale process of jumping the 16 percent of people now in
Class E and F houses over the heads of the much larger numbers now in Class C and
D houses?
26
It would hardly seem just. The widow and orphan, the crippled and
sick, who have no money, we have always with us. They are a separate problem.
The “unlucky” able-bodied are, in times of good employment, sometimes responsi-
ble for their own “bad luck”. Broadly speaking, the working man to whom the
world is willing to pay $2,000 is a better man in some way than those to whom the
world will pay only $1,200 or $800. He has earned more and desires more, or he
would not be getting it. And anyway, he pays more of the taxes which have to fi-
nance these things. He cannot be passed over. (Of course it must always be remem-
bered that not all those in Class E and F houses are there because they cannot afford
anything better; some are there because they cannot get anything better, though
they could pay for it. Some of these will apply for new small houses in the suburbs.)
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8. The Housing Corporation Must Pay Its Way
Then further, the Housing Corporation, though not seeking or making profit,
must pay its way. It will be working on borrowed money. It must pay its bond inter-
est. It must operate in a businesslike way. It will set its rents as low as it can; but ten-
ants who fail to pay their rent must be kindly, firmly, and promptly thrown out. It
will not be, and cannot be, a charity organization, unless someone pays for the char-
ity. The widow and orphan, the crippled and sick must have their rent paid for them
by the Government, the City or somebody; the Corporation could not pay it or give
houses for nothing. The best it could do would be to run a mutual insurance scheme
among its tenants against unexpected family disaster.
9. No Miracles to be Expected
In brief, the Housing Corporation will not inaugurate a wonderful era of free
houses for everybody. It will not find a way whereby a person with no income can
have a good house unless other people, through their Government, pay for it. It will
not set all the injustices of this world right. These things are beyond a Corporation
operating on borrowed money. It will merely seek to build a great many houses, be-
cause there are not enough; and as there come to be enough, after pulling down the
worst, the people will shuffle and deal for themselves all the houses, new and old,
according to their own means and fancy finding their own level.
10. Division into Classes Undesirable27
It is necessary, or at any rate most desirable, for a Housing Authority to avoid a
division into classes; if it can provide grades of accommodation at different prices
and let the people shuffle and deal for themselves, that is best. For example, sup-
pose you put up two apartment buildings. One is subsidized by the Government,
that is, partly paid for, for what we call the poor. The other is somewhat better and is
not subsidized, and its rents pay its way. A young man and his wife, who are poor,
live in the subsidized building. He gets a raise in salary, or begins to do a bit better.
You have then to turn him out and say “this building, helped by Government funds,
is not for such as you. You can pay your own way.” He may be quite content to stay,
but he is penalized because he has done well. This is not good. Besides, you have to
be continually enquiring into the income of your tenants, and this again is very un-
desirable. Again, suppose you build a few streets of small houses partly with Gov-
ernment funds, and other streets with ordinary commercial borrowed funds. Is the
first lot to be known as the pauper district? And are you to enquire yearly into the in-
come of the tenants, and turn those who have improved their financial position out
to find a place elsewhere? This is one of the acute problems of public housing and
this state of affairs must be avoided at all costs. The strongest efforts must be made
to obtain, by construction, reconditioning and private enterprise, accommodation
at all levels of cost, including the lowest, and leave the people to find their own lev-
els in these as independent citizens. And if the lowest priced accommodation which
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can be found by any of these methods is still too dear for a few, then the public,
through its Government funds and its taxes, must assist them to pay their rent. There
is no other logical solution except to allow them to build shacks, as they do now, in
the outskirts of the town, and live under unhygienic conditions which it is our aim to
abolish.
11. Policy for the Poorest Classes
What then can we do for the poorest classes in the worst houses, those whose
condition is most urgent and most appealing?
FIRST, if we build enough houses for those who can afford to pay, now or by
instalments, more houses in town in the lower grades will become available for rent
and rents, now based on scarcity, will tend to fall. Even if a rich man builds for him-
self, on his own funds, a house in the suburbs, that sets free one more house in town.
Everybody can, so to speak, move up one step.
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SECOND; many of the poorer houses in town can be brought up to a decent
standard if their owners can obtain cheap long-term reconditioning loans from the
Corporation.
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THIRD; The Corporation will make sewered building land much cheaper than
at present, thus encouraging private buildings.
FOURTH; The Corporation, while building for those of limited means who
can afford it (not, of course, for the well-to-do) will experiment and see what is the
very best that can be done in building the very small house on the most economical
basis for the lowest-income classes; and if this cannot be got low enough at present
it should be possible to squeeze it down lower when costs begin to fall, as we hope,
after the war.
FIFTH; The monthly cost of houses worked out in the Third Interim Report
contains five parts or factors: a large factor for rental, a large factor for instalment
purchase, and three small factors for taxes, insurance and repairs. If we cut out the
instalment purchase factor in some cases, and charge a cost for rent only, with in-
surance, taxes and repair, we can make the monthly cost lower.
SIXTH; We are advised, on the basis of foreign experience, that we can build a
family living unit for rental purposes more cheaply in the form of a flat or “apart-
ment” in a block than as an individual separate house. Here is a further saving. Out-
right purchase does not, of course, apply where there is not a separate house; in
those cases we must rent.
SEVENTH; If the system of building plenty of houses and leaving the people
to find their own level turns out too slow, as it may do, in helping those in the worst
houses, or if, as usually happens, those worst off tend to get pushed aside or tram-
pled upon in the shuffle, we can perhaps attack the slum problem directly after the
war by getting hold of some of the disused barracks
30
and using them as temporary
summer accommodation while we endeavour to re-house the occupants of con-
demned houses on the spot or elsewhere by the means, either of low-cost individual
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houses for rent or apartment flats for rent, indicated under the preceding para-
graphs.
By that time we shall have experimented and seen at what cost we can build
this lowest priced accommodation, and what prospect there is of cutting down that
cost with falling prices.
12. This Policy Not New
Those lines of policy will be found indicated in the Third Interim Report, but
they are here more fully explained, partly to answer the Government’s question,
partly to prevent confused or over-optimistic thinking and possible disappoint-
ments. However, no policy need be too rigid; and to attempt to lay down every de-
tail in advance is unnecessary and even a mistake. Policies can be changed if
necessary as experience is gained. At any rate the poorest classes, whose position is
largely the cause of this whole movement, are bound to be better off if there is an or-
ganized body seeking ways to meet their needs than now, when they are left to their
own devices. Some answer can be found to every problem as we go along.
* * *
DOCUMENT 2
MEMORANDUM SUGGESTING EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE
CONDITION OF “SHACK” DWELLING HOUSES BEFORE
THE COMING WINTER (1944-5)
1. There is undoubtedly a strong desire in the minds of the public that some-
thing must be done without delay in relation to the housing of the extreme poor
whose position has received advertisement in the recent Hutchings case.
2. The programme proposed by the Commission of Enquiry on Housing and
Town Planning, approved by the authorities concerned and now commenced by the
St. John’s Housing Corporation, is one designed to deal with the housing situation
on a large and long-continued scale, and based upon an attack on fundamentals.
The scheme will, for example, provide:
(1) an abundance of relatively cheap building sites with sewage and other facilities.
(2) a resultant degree of control by force of competition over the cost of sites in the
town and other suburbs, and a tendency to discontinue building on unsewered sites.
(3) finance for home building at low interest rates.
(4) long-term amortizing loans.
(5) a measure of mass production of small houses, which should reduce cost.
(6) a measure of education in the matter of design, layout, surroundings and other
housing standards.
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3. The indicated need of the community is about 2,500 houses, if we are to get
to the level of one family per house, besides destroying houses unfit for habitation.
This programme will eventually represent an expenditure of ten or eleven million
dollars, to be secured in the main by long-term self-liquidating loans to the purchas-
ers. This is a large sum but not beyond the means of the public, given cheap finance
and ten or fifteen years of operation. Obviously, however, it is not a programme
which can be carried out overnight. It will take a considerable number of years.
4. This scheme will benefit the lower-income classes, down to, it is hoped, the
labourer in steady work; that is to say all classes whose income contains a margin
out of which a home can, however slowly, be purchased; but it cannot directly ben-
efit those whose income does not contain any such margin or whose income is alto-
gether absent or insufficient for living.
5. It will be the object of the Housing Corporation to produce a proportion of
dwelling units (houses or apartments) at the very lowest cost, consistent with ade-
quate quality, and probably some of these for rental, instead of for rental-purchase,
which will make them cheaper still; but even so there will be a class which cannot
reach them.
6. If a couple of thousand houses are added to our total stock and a correspond-
ing number of families vacate existing houses, rents of the inferior class of house
will have to drop and, to a certain extent, the poorest class may be able to move up to
those houses which are a shade above the slum; but only to a certain extent. A good
many of them cannot pay rents which would warrant the up-keep of even these very
poor houses.
7. This subject has been fully gone over in reports of the Commission of En-
quiry and it has been pointed out that decent housing can be provided for the low-
est-income or very poor classes only if the government subsidizes either by paying
all or part of the cost of the houses, or better, by paying all or part of these people’s rent.
8. The Commission of Enquiry has already pointed out that slum clearance as
such is impracticable at the moment because no slum can be cleared unless the peo-
ple have somewhere to go, and at present they have not. Pressure on accommoda-
tion must therefore be reduced before any slum clearance can take place.
9. The question has been asked why the people cannot be accommodated
somewhere while houses are built for them. The answer is that temporary accom-
modation costs almost as much as permanent. We may after the war be able to avail
of some temporary military buildings, but even then there will be considerable ex-
pense in converting them for even temporary family use.
10. Again, it has been pointed out that the population is divided somewhat as
follows:
Living in luxury and good houses 21%
Living in fair and semi-slum houses 62%
Living in bad slum houses 17%
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It cannot be expected that public funds should be used to jump this 17 percent at the
bottom of the list into what would be Class B houses over the heads of 62 percent
who are in houses much lower than Class B, especially when the latter can carry
their own loans whereas the former would have to be housed by government expen-
diture.
11. We have spent generations in putting together a town which is 60%
sub-standard and it is quite useless to hope or expect that this situation can be
curbed in anything less than a considerable number of years and without an expense
so great that, unless it is for the most part financed by householders themselves, it
cannot be faced. Therefore it is as well to face here and now that no immediate relief
can be hoped for those classes of which the Hutchings-Drover case has given us an
example, except by the general raising of the standard of accommodation over a
long period of years.
12. In the meantime their condition is what we have seen and humanity de-
mands that some palliative measures be taken to tide them over while general im-
provement is coming about.
13. For this particular year it is very late but something might yet be done, and
the suggestion is as follows: the Government, which is at present well in funds,
might set aside a sum of, say, $25,000 for this purpose. A responsible person should
be obtained, provided with a car and some help, and asked to produce within about
a week, more or less, a complete list of those shacks or small houses in the city and
surroundings which are not tight against wind and rain. It is suggested that a ser-
geant or a couple of sergeants of Constabulary would be the best for this purpose.
They know the town and people; are not likely to be imposed upon and are econom-
ically minded and accustomed to exercise authority.
14. These supervisors should then be given an open order for board, clapboard,
roll roofing, tarred paper, glass and nails, and provided with or authorized to find
necessary labour to have such minimum rough repairs done to walls, roofs and
floors of shacks and very poor houses as will keep out the rain and wind, with a limit
of $100 on any one structure, unless the supervisors permit this to be exceeded for
any special reason. Where the people are capable of putting on the material them-
selves, they should be required to put it on. The sum indicated would be sufficient
to do the rudiments of repair to say 200 to 250 of the worst structures, sufficiently to
protect the occupants from the elements. This would tide the people over for a time
until the situations begins to clear itself, and at the same time will give us a survey
which may reduce the very acute part of the problem to smaller proportions than is
popularly supposed [emphasis in original]. This measure will at any rate quiet the
public mind and there is no time between now and when the snow comes for any
more elaborate scheme.
15. Where the occupants are in the opinion of the sergeants, supplemented if
necessary by consultation with the Welfare Division, able to provide repairs for
themselves and should do so, there is nothing to be done.
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16. Where the recipient is a tenant, there is nothing to be done unless the ser-
geant is of the opinion that the landlord cannot reasonably be expected to do it, (for
example, where he is getting no rent and merely letting the people remain) and after
the landlord has signed a note undertaking not to raise the rent to this or a later ten-
ant.
17. The sergeants to have final authority to deal with each case.
* * *
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, Dunfield was wrong in his assumption that the SJHC would help to
find a solution to the problem of the downtown slum. When he stepped down as
Chair of the Corporation in 1949, compelled by the Dominion Judges Act to do so
— much against his will — the downtown area was much as it had been when the
CEHTP was created in 1942. At the same time most of the original members of the
Corporation’s Board were replaced by the new provincial government and the role
of the Corporation changed from that of a developer and house builder to a seller of
lots. During the first five years of its life the Corporation built 233 houses and 92
apartments and made 250 serviced lots available to private builders. Unfortunately,
a combination of a Board inexperienced in dealing with a project of this size, the ad-
ministrative costs involved in creating such a complex organization from scratch,
the scarcity of skilled tradesmen, and the staggering shortages and resulting high
cost of every type of building material and fitting all made the houses extraordi-
narily expensive. The first 30 houses offered for sale on 5 June 1946 ranged in price
from $9,500 to $13,000, with an average of $11,500, at a time when a good house in
St. John’s could be had for $7,000 (Winter, 1999). These apparently exorbitant
prices caused a flood of letters to the editors of both daily newspapers and some
acerbic editorial comment as well (Evening Telegram, 1946a, 1946b, 1946c). It
was a public relations disaster, and the SJHC responded by modifying the specifica-
tions of the second batch of 50 houses, stripping them of every possible “extra” fea-
ture (including the furnace) in the hope that the price could be reduced by $2,000
(Evening Telegram, 1946d). The reduction turned out to be less than this, hardly
enough to satisfy the critics, one of whom referred to Churchill Park as “the Mecca
of citizens in search of homes and not in the least associated with residents of the
condemned areas” (Evening Telegram, 1950).
The city had contributed a substantial amount of its limited funds towards the
new housing project and “was greatly disappointed in the manner in which this
money had been used. Council’s understanding at the time they agreed to the
Housing Report was that their money would be spent on “removing the unsightly
hovels in which people were living,” and it was very dissatisfied with the failure of
the Corporation to do anything to relieve inner-city housing congestion (Minutes of
the St. John’s Municipal Council, 22 May 1947). The city’s lack of support for the
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operation of the Corporation was undoubtedly one of the key reasons for its reorga-
nization in 1949.
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The St. John’s Housing Corporation was absorbed into the Newfoundland and
Labrador Housing Corporation (NLHC) in 1981. During its 37 years it acquired and
serviced 2,200 acres of land, built 233 houses, 334 apartments, and provided 4,100
serviced building lots to private house builders, families, and co-operatives. But its
most significant legacy was that it made possible the post-Confederation construc-
tion of the public housing that finally created the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the eradication of the downtown slum and the rehousing of many of its
former inhabitants. In 1949 the new provincial government inherited a large, ser-
viced land bank at the same time as it gained access to the new federal/provincial
partnership programs offered by Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation. It
made quick and effective use of these programs. Between 1950 and 1955, 584 units
of public housing were built in St. John’s under the new federal/provincial pro-
gram. Four of the projects, containing 538 units, were in Churchill Park. By 1961
St. John’s contained 5 per cent of Canada’s public housing stock, although it had
only 0.5 per cent of the country’s population. In many Canadian cities, opposition
to public housing was too strong to permit substantial use of the generous federal
grants (75 per cent of the cost of building and of the operating deficit). But in St.
John’s the case for state intervention in the housing market had already been readily
accepted by the Commission of Government and, apparently, by the people. This is
the legacy of the St. John’s Housing Corporation. The Corporation didn’t manage
to build housing for the poor or to clear the slum. But the fact that CMHC was able to
do so, and so quickly, was the unintended but fortunate outcome of the groundwork
laid by Brian Dunfield and his Corporation.
Notes
1
Penson to Puddester, 1 Aug. 1939. PANL, GN38, 55-2-1. Box 1, File 9. J.H. Penson
(21 Jan. 1893–1 June 1979) has recently been described as a “little-known British botanist,”
about whom nothing is known of his early life or education (Foley, 2006). He served in a Sig-
nals unit of the Royal Engineers between 1916 and 1919 and was awarded the Military Cross
in 1918 and a bar in 1919 during his service in Russia. Around 1923 he moved into govern-
ment finance and in 1928 was appointed Assistant Secretary to the Commission on Muse-
ums and Galleries. In 1930 he wrote an article on “The Financing of Russian Industry” in the
Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the next year was appointed a
member of the Newfoundland Royal Commission and in 1934 became Commissioner for
Finance in the Commission of Government. He was replaced in 1941. During his time in
Newfoundland he put together a collection of botanical specimens that he later donated to
the Université de Montréal. In 1942 he was awarded the CMG (Order of St. Michael and St.
George) for his past services. In 1944 he was appointed Secretary-General to the British
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Supply Mission in Washington and in 1953 was awarded the CB (Order of the Bath) for his
services in that post.
2
Eleemosynary means supported by or dependent on charity; gratuitous or free.
3
This report, written by the chairman of the subcommittee, Major W.F. Ingpen, dated
7 Oct. 1929, and all the other records of the Town Planning Commission chaired by the Hon.
Mr. Justice Kent have disappeared. Fortunately, the report was reprinted verbatim in the
Evening Telegram, 30 Jan. 1930.
4
There is an extensive literature on the potential role of filtering in housing market op-
erations. See Grigsby (1963); Kristof (1965, 1973); Altshuler (1969); Lansing et al. (1965);
Ratcliff (1945); Sands and Bower (1974); Sharpe (1978a, 1978b); Smith (1970); Watson
(1974).
5
Penson to Puddester, 1 Aug. 1939, PANL. GN38, S5-2-1, Box 1, File 9.
6
John Henry Gorvin, C.B.E., was born in 1896 in Bideford, Devon. He served twice
as Britain’s Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1906-14 and 1926-28. In 1918 he was ap-
pointed Assistant Secretary of the Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies and in 1921, Gen-
eral Secretary of the International Relief Credits Committee in Paris. In 1920 he was
awarded the Order of St. Sava, Third Class, by His Majesty the King of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes in recognition of his services as Chief of the British Transport Committee for the
Relief of Devastated Countries. He was highly regarded as both competent and conscien-
tious. In 1938 he published two works relating to reconstruction and economic development
in Newfoundland in which he suggested that the Great Depression was a good time to intro-
duce new industry and economic and social reforms in order to tackle the problem of unem-
ployment. See Ommer (2001: 28); Cadigan (2001).
7
Gorvin to Puddester, 17 Aug. 1939, PANL, GN38, S5-2-1, Box 1. File 9.
8
Commissioner for Public Utilities to Clerk of the City Council, 8 May 1941, PANL,
GN38, S5-2-1, Box 1, File 9.
9
Carnell to H.A. Winter, 11 Apr. 1941, GN38, S3-1-1, File 3.
10
Brian Edward Spencer Dunfield, B.A. (1909, University of London), K.B., Q.C.,
was born in St. John’s in 1888. After being called to the bar in 1911 he had a brief, unspectac-
ular career in private practice before joining the Department of Justice in 1928. He became
Secretary for Justice in 1932 and was appointed to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland in
1939 where he sat until his retirement in 1963. He chaired the Commission of Enquiry into
Housing and Town Planning in St. John’s (1942-44), the St. John’s Housing Corporation
(1944-49), and the St. John’s Town Planning Commission (1949-51). He served a three-year
term as President of the Community Planning Association of Canada and at the time of his
death in 1968 was Chairman of the Corner Brook Housing Corporation. He was made a
member of the Order of Knights Bachelor in 1949 in recognition of his outstanding public
service.
11
Gordon Winter served as the sixth Lieutenant-Governor of Newfoundland,
1974-81.
12
The southern boundary of Churchill Park (along Empire Avenue, formerly the Old
Railway Road) was less than a mile from the heart of the downtown, but some were dubious
about the possibility of attracting people and businesses to an area so far away. Hence the
nickname “Dunfield’s Folly” (Shrimpton and Lewis, 1983: 10). Mayor Carnell’s character-
ization of the development as “The New Jerusalem” has been confirmed by both Gordon
Winter (personal communication) and Leonard Miller (interview with Mark Shrimpton).
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Written references include Vardy (1967: 393), who is then quoted in Baker (1983: 31) and
Denhez (1994: 100).
13
During the 15 years when Newfoundland was governed by the appointed Commis-
sion of Government, the Municipal Council of St. John’s was the only democratically
elected body in the country.
14
The Commission of Government contributed both loans and grants to a total of $5.3
million ($58.2 million in constant 2002 dollars) and the city, $1.2 million ($13.2 million in
constant 2002 dollars).
15
The Daily News, 16 July 1943, reported that “St. John’s these days turns a hard and
inhospitable face to the single young lady seeking a place to live.... most people prefer to rent
their rooms to men, preferably for some reason Canadian Officers, or Construction men, and
will refuse to rent a room when they learn that the prospective tenant is female.”
16
The distribution of these 472 employees was: U.S. base contractors, 45%; E.G.
Cape and Company, 27%; U.S. Army, 11%; U.S. engineers, 10%; Canadian contractors,
6%; Royal Canadian Engineers, 3%; and the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, and
Royal Canadian Air Force, less than 1% each.
17
Dunfield’s philosophy did incorporate the belief that “sub-economic housing is an
experiment that must be tried, even if only on a moderate scale” (CEHTP, 1943: 67) but that
“such an experiment . . . can be carried out only by a public non-profit corporation.”
18
A typescript of this document is in the files of the Commissioner for Justice and De-
fence: PANL, GN38, S5-2-1, Box 1. The printed version appear in the Fifth Interim Report of
the CEHTP (January 1944), pp. 30-34.
19
In February 1945 the Governor wrote to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
responding to a number of rather pointed questions that the latter had sent to him about the
proposed activities of the SJHC. One of these had to do with the question of whether there
was any intention of attempting to deal directly with the downtown slum. The Governor’s
reply relied heavily on what Dunfield had told the Government. He wrote: “In Chapter IV of
the Fourth (sic: this should have read Fifth) Interim Report of the Commission of Enquiry
particular reference was made to the problem of rehousing the poorest classes who occupied
the worst houses and whose condition was recognized as being the most urgent. It was, how-
ever, emphasized in this Report that the Housing Corporation, which it was proposed to es-
tablish, must operate on a sound economic basis and that it would not be in a position to
subsidise the provision of accommodation for the poor who were unable to pay an adequate
rental. In the view of the Housing Commission the process of stepping up from lower grade
houses to houses of higher grade vacated by families which could afford still better houses,
or new houses to be erected by the Corporation, would in time do much to relieve the prob-
lem at the bottom of the scale and could be supplemented by the reconditioning of existing
dwellings.” He also noted that “the St. John’s Municipal Council has expressed concern that
the plans of the Housing corporation are unlikely to be adequate or to provide any immediate
remedy to alleviate the appalling slum conditions in which large number of the people live.”
Telegram No. 34, Governor Sir Humphrey Walwyn to Viscount Cranborne, 8 Feb. 1945,
PANL, PRC 14, Box 15-5-3-1; File-Housing, General-Indigent Persons. Dunfield’s influ-
ence was pervasive and remained the party line until after Newfoundland entered the Cana-
dian confederation and new policies and programs became available to the new province. In
1944 John Bland, the Director of the School of Architecture at McGill University in Mon-
treal, was invited by the Commission of Town Planning — chaired by Brian Dunfield at the
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same time as he was the Chairman of the SJHC and a Justice of the Supreme Court — to pre-
pare a proposal for land-use planning in the city. Bland visited the city in the summers of
1944 and 1945 before writing the report. Its foreword was written by Dunfield, and his influ-
ence is apparent in several sections. In the brief section on housing, Bland (1946: 22) re-
ferred to the suburban development that was then under construction and noted that “this
will undoubtedly relieve pressure on accommodation in the city by making available an am-
ple supply of building land with services.”
20
PHW 71-’44, 16 Dec. 1944, PANL, PRC 14, Box 15-5-3-1, File: Housing: General:
Indigent Persons.
21
PHW 71(a)-’44, Minutes of meeting held December 22nd between a Committee of
the Commission of Government and the St. John’s Housing Corporation, PANL, GN38,
S5-2-1, Box 1, File 9.
22
PHW 16 (b)-’45, Dunfield to Wild, Commission for Finance, 21 Apr. 1945, PANL,
GN38, S3-5-3, File 5.
23
The records of these meetings provide interesting insights into the philosophy that
inspired some of those involved. An aide-memoire prepared by Dunfield after the 22 De-
cember meeting and circulated to the Government criticized the city’s idea to put all the pro-
posed units on a single piece of land on Campbell Avenue — the only suitable site that had
been found inside the city limits. Dunfield’s note indicates that “the question of segregation
or dispersal was argued. It was pointed out by us that it was very undesirable for all these
widows and their families to be segregated in what would come to be known as pauper build-
ings. This would be bad for the children’s morale. We were very desirous of having them dis-
persed among the other working class tenants. Everybody agreed that this was desirable in
principle.” What is even more interesting is the note recording an observation made by A.E.
(Ed) Searles, the Housing Corporation’s resident engineer. He “observed that in the United
States it had been found desirable to finish the interiors of apartments for the lowest-income
classes in a stronger style than those built for the self-supporting classes, the reason being
that as these people have not the funds to make good small dilapidations as they occur, as is
done by the economic tenant, deterioration tends to take place more rapidly. Thus it has been
found best to go to a little more capital expense at the outset with a view to the saving of
maintenance later. To take one example, he would suggest cement plaster instead of ordi-
nary plaster or wallboard as being more resistant to small damage.” The implicit class-based
assumptions underlying this apparently neutral observation were shared by housing admin-
istrators in many other jurisdictions, including the Canadian Central Mortgage and Housing
Corporation. (Note circulated to the Commission of Government on 4 Jan. 1945, PANL, PRC
14, Box 15-5-3-1, Miscellaneous. File: Housing-General-Indigent Persons.)
24
Dunfield was nothing if not well informed. The statistics in this section suggest that
he was privy to the letter that E.C. Price, the Newfoundland Food Controller, sent to the
Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare on 2 Dec. 1943. In it he noted that there were
400 RCN officers and 1,650 men “being fed as civilians. There is reason to believe that the
Naval Forces here will be shortly reinforced and that about 350 ratings will be added to the
total number now being fed otherwise than in barrack areas.” GN38, S6-1-7, File 4A.
25
According to both Gordon Winter and Paul Meschino, the architect for the SJHC, the
construction of the main collector sewer through the previously undrained valley in which
Churchill Park would be built was the most important single contribution the SJHC made to
the future development of the city. Winter (1998); Meschino (2000).
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26
Here is the crux of the problem — and the reason why it took so long to create poli-
cies permitting the construction of subsidized housing for the poor. It was one thing to pro-
vide housing specifically targeted for groups that most people would consider deserving and
unable to help themselves. Thus, there was no serious opposition to the joint project under-
taken by the city and the Government in 1947 to build the 140 “Widow’s Mansions” on
Cashin Avenue that were expressly intended to house indigent widows and their children.
But it is never easy for politicians to support policies that many of their constituents would
characterize as helping the “undeserving poor” at their expense. This rationale underlies the
rest of this paragraph.
27
This section contains the classic argument in favour of allowing the market to find a
solution, on the assumption that interventions would inevitably introduce inequities.
28
Here is a clear statement of Dunfield’s belief in the efficiency and fairness of the
“filtering” model of housing provision.
29
These would now be called “home improvement” loans and they were a long time
coming in both Canadian and Newfoundland legislation.
30
Only Canadian barracks would have been available, since the Americans continued
to occupy Fort Pepperrell for another 20 years. However, there were plenty of those — the
Army barracks at Lester’s Field, the RCAF No. 1 Group barracks on Kenna’s Hill, most of
the RCN barracks in Buckmaster’s Circle, and the new and unused RCN quonset huts on the
South Side Hills, with a potential capacity of over 2,000 people in their original configura-
tion. However, this noble idea was made impossible by the insistence of the Newfoundland
Commission of Government that all the Canadian wartime buildings be demolished as
quickly as possible at the end of hostilities.
31
The Government had lost faith in the basic premise of the Corporation in 1946 and it
was decided that no new funds would be allocated to support its operation. The Commis-
sioner for Finance expressed concern that some of the Corporation’s houses had been sold to
people from the outports, and “to the extent that this practice is followed, the Corporation are
defeating the main object of the scheme which is to relieve the existing congestion in St.
John’s (F111-’46, 24 Oct. 1946). Home Affairs and Education Commissioner H.A. Winter
wrote to his colleagues that the cost of the Churchill Park houses was “much greater than
forecast in the Commission of Enquiry reports and few, if any, have been disposed of to the
middle class and poorer worker in whose interests the scheme was originally adopted....
While it is desirable to have a garden suburb for St. John’s it seems to me that the conditions
described by the Housing Commission in its Third Interim Report are not likely to be reme-
died for many years by building houses at the cost at which they are being built by the ... Cor-
poration. The Corporation has built 102 better class houses and 51 cheaper houses are in the
course of construction. They will cost between $7,000 and $8,000 and are really out of the
reach of the middle class workman” (HAE 126-’46, 13 Nov. 1946).
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